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Abstract 
'I'he processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a sta-
ble fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes 
include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations aga.in;;t 
bottom-up data, the focn;;ing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the 
development of reoonant states between bottom-up a.nd top-clown processes a.s they reach 
a.n attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. 
It is suggested that a.ll conscious states in the brain are resonant states, and that these 
resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The model;; which 
summarize these concept;; are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART', models. 
Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of Aitr are presented from ea.rly vision, 
visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, sornatosen·· 
sory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that AHT 
mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how 
these mechanisms arc realized by known larninar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted 
that the same circuit realization of AJTI' mechani:;m:; will be found in the laminar circuits 
of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how 
some visual percept:; rnay be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas arnodal percepts may be 
consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that 
sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down 
rnatching and learning laws that arc often complementary to those used for spatial and motor 
processing in the brain's Where proce;;sing ;;tream. 'I'lris enables our sensory and cognitive 
representations to maintain their stability a.s we learn more about the world, while allowing 
spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appro-
priate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural rnemorie;; 
are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory rnatching proce;;s that supports these 
spatial and motor proces;;es cannot lead to resonance. 
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How Do We Continue to Learn Throughout Life? 
We experience the world as a whole. Although myriad signals relentlessly bombard 
our senses, we somehow integrate them into unified moments of conscious experience that 
cohere together despite their diversity. Because of the apparent unity and coherence of our 
awareness, we can develop a sense of self that can gradually mature with our experiences of 
the world. This capacity lie:,; at the heart of our ability to function as intelligent beings. 
'fhe apparent unity and coherence of our experiences is all the more remarkable when 
we consider several properties of how the brain copes with the environmental events that it 
processes. First and foremost, these events are highly context-sensitive. When we look at a. 
complex picture or ;;cene as a whole, we ca.n often recognize its objects and its meaning at a 
glance, a.s in the picture of a familiar face. However, if we process the face piece-by-piece, as 
through a ;;mall aperture, then its significance ma.y be greatly degraded. To cope with this 
context-sensitivity, the brain typically processes pictures and other sense data in parallel, as 
patterns of activation across a large number of feature-sensitive nerve cells, or neurons. 'I'he 
same is true for ;;enses other than vision, such a;; audition. H the sound of the word GO 
is altered by clipping off the vowel 0, then the consonant G may sound like a chirp, quite 
unlike its sound as pa.rt of GO. 
During vision, all the signals frorn a scene typically reach the photosensitive retinas of the 
eyes at essentially the same time, so parallel processing of aJl the scene's parts begins a.t the 
retina itself. During audition, each successive sound reaches the ear a.t a. later time. Before 
an entire pattern of sounds, such as the word GO, can be processed as a whole, it needs 
to be recoded, at a later processing stage, into a simultaneously available spatial pattern of 
activation. Such a processing stage i;; often called a working rnemory, and the activations 
that it stores arc often called t:hort term memory (STM) trace;;. For example, when you hear 
an unfamiliar telephone number, you can temporarily store it in working rnemory while you 
walk over to the telephone and dial the nurnber. 
In order to determine which of these pattern;; represents familiar events and which do 
not, the brain matches these pattern;; against, stored representations of prcviou;; cxperienceo 
that have been acquired through learning. Unlike the S'I'M traces that are stored in a 
working rnernory, the learned experiences arc fitored in long term rnemory (L'I'M) trace;;. 
One difference between S'I'M and LTM trace;; concerns how they react to distractions. For 
exa.rnple, if you a,re distracted by a loud noise before you dia.l a. new telephone number, its 
S'J'iVl repre;;enJation can be rapidly reset so that you forget it. On the other hand, if you arc 
clistractccl by a. loud noi;;e, yon (hopdully) will not forget the J;J'iVJ representation of your 
own narnc. 
'I'he problern of learning rnake;; the unity of consciou;; experience particularly hard to 
understand, if only because we are able to rapidly learn such enorrnou;; a.rnounts of new 
information, on our own, throughout life. For example, after seeing an exciting movie, we 
can tc11 our friend;; nwny detail;; about it later on, even though the individual scimcs flashed 
by very quickly. ]VIow gcncra.lly, we can quickly learn about new environments, even if no 
one tells us bow the rulm of each environrncnt differ. 'I'o a snrprising degree, we can rapidly 
learn new facts without being forced to just as rapidly forget what we already know. As a. 
reoult, Wf) do not need to avoid going out into the world for fea.r that, in learning to recognize 
a. new friend's face, we will suddenly forget our parents' faces. 
T have called the problern whereby the brain learns quickly a.nd ;;t.ably without catastroph-
ically forgetting its past knowledge the stability-pla.sticity clilcrnma. 'I'he ;;tability-pla.sticity 
dilemma. must be solved by every brain system that needs to rapidly and ada.ptively respond 
to the I1ood of signa.lo that subservcs even the rno;;t ordinary experiences. If the brain's 
design is parsirnonious, then we ;;hould expect to find similar design principles operating in 
all the brain systems that can stably learn an accumulating knowledge base in response to 
changing conditions throughout life. 'I'hc discovery of such principles should clarify how the 
brain unifies diverse sources of information into coherent moments of conscious experience. 
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Thi:; article review:; evidence that the brain doe:; operate in this way. It summarizes 
several recent brain rnodcling studies that illustrate, and further develop, a theory called 
Adaptive Resonance 'I'heory, or AHT, that I introduced in 1976 (Grossberg, l976a, 197Gb, 
1978, 1980, 1982). In the present article, I will briefly summarize results selected from four 
areas where AHT principles have been used to explain challenging behavioral and brain data. 
'I'hesc areas are visual perception, visual object recognition, auditory source identification, 
and variable-rate speech recognition. On first inspection, the behavioral properties of these 
visual and auditory phenomena may secrn to be entirely unrelated. On a deeper compu-
tational level, their governing neural circuits arc proposed to incorporate a similar set of 
computational principles. 
I should also say right away, however, that Artl' principles do not seem to be used in all 
brain learning systems. Whereas An:r lea.rning designs help to explain :;ensory and cognitive 
processes such as perception, recognition, attention, reinforcernent, recall, working memory, 
and memory search, other types of learning seem to govern spatial and motor processes. 
In these latter task domains, it is adaptive to forget old coordinate tran:Jonnations as the 
brain's control system:; adjust to a growing body and to other changes in the body's sen wry--
motor endowment throughout life. 
Sensory and cognitive processes are often associated with the What cortical process-
ing stream that passes from visual cortex through infcroternporal cortex, whereas spatial 
and motor processe:; are associated with the Where (or How) cortical processing :;tream 
that passes frorn visual cortex through paricta.l cortex (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Mishkin, 
Ungcrlcider, and Macko, 198:); Ungerleicler and Mishkin, 1982). Our re:;earch over the years 
has concluded that many processes in the two distinct streams, notably their matching and 
learning processes, obey different, and even cmnplcmcntary, law:;. This fact bears heavily on 
questions of consciousness, and helps to explain why procedural Tnemorie:; arc not conscious 
(Cohen and Squire, 1980; Mishkin, 1982; Scoville and i'viilner, 1957; Squire and Cohen, 1984). 
Indeed, a central hypothesis of AHT since its inception i:; 
ART Hypothesis: All con;;cious ;;tatcs arc resonant state:;. 
As noted in greater detail below, rnany ;;patial and rnotor processc;; involve a form of 
inhibitory matching and mi:;match-based learning that doe:; not support rewnant state;;. 
lienee, by the AHT Hypothesis, they cannot support a, conscious state. Although AH1' pre-
dicts that all conscious states are rc;;onant states, the converse statcrnent, that all resonant 
states are conscious states, is not yet asserted. 
Various other models of cognitive learning and recognition, such as the popular back-
propagation model (Parker, 1982; Rurnelhart, Hinton, and Williarns, Hl86; Werbos, 1974), 
arc based on a form of misrnatch-- based learning. 'J'hcy cannot, therefore, generate resonant 
states and, in fact, arc well known to experience catastrophic forgetting under rcal-tinrc 
learning conditions. A cornparative survey of AHT vs. ba.ckpropagation computational 
properties is provided in Grossberg ( J 988). 
How Do We Perceive Illusory Contours and Brightness? 
Let rnc start by providing several exa.rnples of the diverse phenomena that AH'l' clarifies. 
Consider the images in Figure I. Figure la shows an image called an Ehrenstein figure 
in which oome radial black lines arc drawn on a uniformly white paper. Remarkably, our 
rninds construct a circular illusory contour that touches each line end at a perpendicular 
orientation. 'J'his illusory contcmr i:; a collective, emergent property of all the lines that only 
occurs when their positions relative to each other are suitable. For example, no illusory 
contour fonm; at the line ends in Figure lb even though they end at the sarne positions as 
the lines in Figure la. Note alw that the illusory contour in Figure la surrounds a disk that 
secrns uniformly brighter than it;; ;;urround. Where doe;; the brightness enhancement cornc 
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Figure 1. (A) 'J'hc Ehrenstein pattern generates a circular illusory contour that encloses a 
circular disk of enhanced illusory brightness. (B) If the endpoints of the Ehrenstcin pattern 
remain fixed while their orientations arc tilted, then both the illusory contour and brightness 
vanish. (C) The offset pattern generates a vertical boundary that can be recognized even 
though it cannot be seen. 
from? It certainly does not always happen when illusory contours form, as can bo seen by 
inspecting Figure I c. Here a vertical illusory contour can be recognized as interpolating the 
two sets of offset horizontal lines, even though neither side of the contour seems brighter 
than the other. How we can consciously recognize something that we cannot see, and is 
thus perceptually invisible, is a fascinating aspect of our conscious awareness about which 
quite a. bit is now known. Such percepts are known as 1rmorla.J percepts (Michotte, 'I'hines, 
and Crabbe, 1964) in order to distinguish them from rnoclal, or visible, percepts. Arnodal 
percepts arc experienced in response to many naturalistic scenes, notably in response to 
scenes in which sorne objects arc partially occluded by other objects. How both rnodal and 
arnodal percepts can occur is modeled in (irossberg (1994, 1997). Of particular interest 
from the viewpoint of AH:I' processing is why the Ehrenstcin disk looks bright, despite the 
fact that there a.re no local contrasts within the image itself that describe a disk-like object. 
Cove e! at. (1995) provide a.n explanation of this illusion using AH1' mechanisrns that are 
described below. 
How Do We Learn to Recognize Visually Perceived Objects? 
'!'he Ehrenstein example concerns the. process of visual perception. T'he next cxarnplc 
concerns a. process that goes on at a higher level of the visual system. lt is the process 
whereby we visually recognize objects. i\ key part of this process concerns how we learn to 
categorize specific instances of an object, or set of objects, into a. rnorc general concept .. For 
exarnple, bow do we learn that ma.ny different printed or script letter fonts can all repre-
sent the same letter A? Or how clo we learn tha.t several different. combinations of patient. 
syrnptoms are all due to the same disease? Moreover, how do we control how general our 
categories will bccorne? For scmrc~ purposes, like recognizing a. particular face, we need highly 
specific categories. For others, like knowing that every person has a. face, the categories arc 
much more general. Finally, how does our learning ancl rncrnory break down when sornething 
goes wrong in our brain? For example, it is known that lesions to the hmnan hippocam-
pal system can cause a form of amnesia. whereby, among other properties, patients find it 
very hard to learn new information and hard to remember recently learned information, but 
previously learned information about 1vhich their memory has "consolidated" can readily be 
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Figure 2. (A) Auditory continuity illusion: When a steady tone occurs both before and 
after a burst of noise, then under appropriate ternporal and amplitude conditions, the tone i:-; 
perceived to continue through the noise. (B) 'I'his docs not occur if the noi:-;e is not followed 
by a tone. 
retrieved. Thus, an amnesic patient can typically carry out a perfectly intelligent conver-
sation about experiences that occurred i\. significant time before the lesion that caused the 
arnnesia. occurred. · 
What computational properties do the phenornena. of bright illu:-;ory disks and amnesic 
memory have in common? I will suggest below that their apparent differences conceal the 
workings of a general unifying principle. 
How Do We Solve the Cocktail Party Problem? 
To continue with our li:-;t, let us now consider a different modality entirely; namely, 
audition. When we ta.lk to a. friend in a. crowded noisy romn, we can usually keep track 
of our conversation above the hubbub, even though the sound:-; em.ittecl by the friendly 
voice rna.y substantially overlap the sounds emitted by other speakers. How clo we :-;eparatc 
this jumbled mixture of sounds into distinct voices? 'l'his is often called the cocktail party 
problem. 'fhe same problem is solved whenever we listen to a :-;yrnphony or other music 
wherein overlapping harmonic components a.rc emitted by several instrurnent:-;. If we could 
not separate the instrurncn(.s or voices into distinct sources, or auditory streams, then we 
could not hear the music a.s rnusic, or intelligently rc:cogni7,e a. speaker's sounds. A striking 
and ubiquitous property of such percepts, and one which has not yet been understand by 
alternative rnodeling a.pproache;;, is how future events can alter our conscious percepts of 
past events in a. context-sensitive manner. 
A sirnple version of this competence is illustrated by the auditory continuity illusion 
(Bregman, 1990). Suppose that a steady tone shuts off just as a broadband noise turns 
on. Suppose, moreover, that the noise shuts off just as the tone turns on once again; see 
Figure 2A. When (.his happens under appropriate conclii.ions, the tone seems to continue 
right through the noit:e, which seems to occur in a. separate <mditory "stream". 'fhis example 
shows that the auditory systorn can actively extract those component:-; of the noise that arc 
consistent with the tone and usc them to track the "voice" of the tone right through the 
hubbub of the noise. 
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In order to appreciate how remarkable this property is, let us compare it with what 
happens when the tone does not turn on again for a second time, as in Figure 2B. Then the 
first tone does not seem to continue through the noise. It is perceived to stop before the 
noise. How does the brain know that the second tone will turn on after the noise shuts off, 
so that it can continue the tone through the noise, yet not continue the tone through the 
noise if the second tone does not eventually occur? Does this not seem to require that the 
brain can operate "backwards in time" to alter its decision as to whether or not to continue 
a past tone through the noise based on future events? 
Many philosophers and scientists have puzzled about this sort of problem. I will argue 
that the process whereby we consciously hear the first tone takes some time to unfold, so 
that by the time we hear it, the second tone has already begun. To make this argument, we 
need to ask why docs conscious audition take so long to occur after the actual sound energy 
reaches our brain? Just as important, why can the second tone influence the conscious 
percept so quickly, given that the first tone could not? Finally, I will indicate what these 
auditory phenomena. ha.vc to do with bright Ehrenst.cin disks a.ncl amnesia.. 
How Do We Consciously Perceive Speech? 
T'hc final example;; also involve the auditory system, but a.t a. higher level of processing. 
They concern how we understand speech. In these examples, too, the process whereby 
conscious awareness occurs takes a long time., on the order of 100 milliseconds or more. An 
analysis of these percepts will also give us more clues about the nature of the underlying 
process. 'J'hc first. example is called phonemic restoration. Suppose that a. listener hears 
a. noise followed immediately by the words "eel is on the ... ". If this string of words is 
l'ollowecl by the word "orange", then "noise-eel" sounds like "peel". If the word "wagon" 
cornplctes the sentence, then "noise-eel" sound;; like "wheel". If the final word is "shoe", 
then "noise-eel" sounds like "heel". 
'T'his marvelous example, which was developed by Richard Warren and his colleagues 
more than twenty years a.go (Warren, 1984; Warren and Sherman, 1971), vividly shows that 
the. bottom-up occurrence of the noise is not suflicic.n(. for us to hear it. Somehow the sound 
that we expect to hear based upon our previous language experiences influences what we do 
hear, a.t least if the sentence is sa.id quickly enough. As in (.he auditory conl:inuity illusion, it 
would appear that the brain is working "backwards in time" to allow the meaning imparted 
by a. later word to a.lter the sounds that we consciously perceive in an earlier word. 
I suggest that this happens bcca.usc, a.s the individual words occur, they arc stored 
temporarily via ST'M traces in a. working rrrcrnory. As the words are stored, they a.ctiva.tc 
J;rM traces which attempt to categori2e the stored sonncl stream into fa.milia.r language nnits 
like words at a higher processing level. 1'lwsc list categories, in turn, activate learned top-
clown expectations tktt arc ma.tchec/ against the contents of working memory to veril'y that 
the information expected from previous learning experiences is really there. 'l'his concept 
of bottom-np activation of learned categories by a. working memory, followed by read-out of 
learned top-clown expectations, is illustrated in Figure ~lA. 
vVhat is the natme of this rna.tching, or verification, process? Its properties have been 
clarified by experiments of Arthur Samuel (Sarnuel, 1981a, 198Jb) and others in which the 
spectra.] content of the noise was varied. If the noise includes all the formants of the expected 
sound, then that. is what the subject bears, ancl other spectral components of the noise are 
suppressed. U some formants of the expected sound are missing from the noise, then only a 
partial reconstruction is heard. If silence replaces the noise, then only silence is heard. 'I'he 
matching process thus cannot "create something out of nothing". It ca.n, however, selectively 
amplify the expected features in the bottom-up signa.! and suppress the rest, as in Figure :lB. 
1'he process whereby the top-down expectation selectively arnplifies some features while 
suppressing others helps to "focus attention" upon information that matches our momentary 
expectations. 'I'his focusing process helps to filter out tbe Hood of sensory signals that would 
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(STM) 
Bottom-up 
adaptive 
filter (LTM) 
Items in working 
memory (STM) 
STM before 
Top-Down 
Matching 
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(B) 
Top-down 
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STM after Ji\ ~op-Down J. l \atchlng 
• • • 
t t t 
Figure 3. (A) Auditory items activate S'fM traces in a working memory, which send 
bottorn-up signals towards a. level at which list categories, or chunks, are activated in S'l'M. 
1'hese bottom-up signals are multiplied by learned l:I'lVI traces which influence the selection 
of the Jist categories that are stored in STM. The list categories, in turn, activate I:fM-
modulatecl top--down expectation signals that are rna.tched against the active S'l'M pattern 
in working memory. (B) 'I'his matching process confirms and arnpli!ies S'l'M activations that 
are supported by contiguous I:rM traces, ancl suppresses those that are not. 
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otherwise overwhelm us, and to prevent them from dcstabili~ing our previously learned mem-
ories. Learned top-down expectations hereby help to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma. 
by focusing attention and preventing spurious signals from accidentally eroding our previ-
ously learned memories. In fact, Gail Carpenter and I proved mathematically in J 987 that 
such an AHT matching rule assures stable learning of an AHT model in response to rapidly 
changing environments wherein learning becomes unstable if the matching rule is removed 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987a). 
What does all this have to do with our conscious percepts of speech? This can be seen by 
asking: lf top-clown expectations can select consistent bottom-up signals, then what keeps 
the selected bottom-up signals from reactivating their top--down expectations in a continuing 
cycle of bottom-up and top-down feedback? Nothing does! In fact, this reciprocal feedback 
process takes awhile to equilibrate, and when it does, the bottorn-up and top-clown signals 
lock the STM activity patterns of the interacting levels into a resonant state that lasts rnucb 
longer and is more energetic than any individual activation. AHT hereby, suggests how 
only resonant states of the brain can achieve consciousness, and that the time needed for a 
bottom-up/top-down resonance to develop helps to explain why a conscious percept of an 
event takes so long to occur after its bottom-up input is delivered. 
The example of phoncrnic restoration also clarifies another key point about the conscious 
perception of speech. If noise precedes "eel is on the shoe", we hear and understand the 
meaning of the sentence "heel is on the shoe". If, however, noise is replaced by silence, we 
hear and understand the meaning of the sentence "eel is on the shoe" which has a quite 
different, and rather disgusting, meaning. This example shows that the process of resonance 
binds together infonnation about both meaning and phonetics. Meaning is not some higher-
order process that is processed independently fronr the proce:;s of conscious phonctic hearing. 
Meaning and phonetics are bound together via resonant feedback into a global emergent state 
in which the phonetics that we hear are linked to the rncanirrg that we understand. 
AH:T Matching and Resonance: The Link Between Attention, Intention, and 
Consciousness 
Adaptive resonance theory claims that, in order to solve the stability-plasticity dilern-
rna, only resonant states can drive new learning. 'J'hat. is why the theory is caJlecl a.da.pUvc 
resonance theory. I will explain how this works more cornpletely below. Before doing so, let 
me crnphasi~e some implications of the previous discussion that arc worth reflecting a.bout. 
'l'hc first inrplication provides a novel answer to why, as philosophers have asked for many 
years, lrurnans are "intentional" beings who are always anticipating or planning their next 
behaviors and their expected consequences. AH1' suggests that "stability irnplies intention·· 
a.Jity". 'I'hat is, stable learning requires that we have expectations about the world that arc 
continually matched against world data. Otherwise expressed, without stable learning, we 
could learn very little about the world. Having an active top-down matching nreclranism 
gr(~atly arnplifres the amount of information that we can stably learn about the world. 'I'hus 
the mechanisms which enable us to know a changing external world, through the usc of 
learned expectations, r;ct Llw stage for achieving internal self-awareness. 
It should be noted here that the word "intentionality" is being used, at once, in two 
difFerent senses. One sense concerns the role of expectations in the anticipation of events 
that rnay or may not occur. 'l'he second sense concerns the ability of expectations to read-
out planned sequences of behaviors airncd at achieving definite behavioral goals. The former 
sense will be emphasized first; the latter towards the end of the article. iVly main point in 
lumping them together is that AHT provides a. unified rncchanistic perspective with which 
to understand both uses of the word. 
'I'he second implication is that "intention implies attention and consciousness". 'I'hat 
is, expectations start to focus attention on data worthy of learning, and these attcntional 
foci a.re confirmed when the system as a whole incorporates thcrn into resonant states that 
8 
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include (1 claim) conscious states of mind. 
Implicit in the concept of intentionality is the idea that we can get ready to experience an 
expected event so that, when it finally occurs, we can react to it more quickly and vigorously, 
and until it occurs, we are able to ignore other, less desired, events. This property is called 
priming. It implies that, when a. top-down expectation is read-out in the absence of a 
bottom-up input, it can subliminally sensitiow the cells that would ordinarily respond to the 
bottom-up input, but not actually fire them, while it suppre:;ses cells whose activity is not 
expected. Corre:;pondingly, the AHT matching rule cornputationally realizes the following 
properties at any processing level where bottom-up and top-clown signals are matched: 
• Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or node, can become active enough to 
generate output signals if it receives a large enough bottom-up input, other things being 
equal. 
• Top-Down Priming: A cell can become sensitized, or subliminally active, and thus 
cannot generate output signals, if it receives only a. large top-down expectation input. 
Such a top-down priming signal prepares a cell to react more quickly and vigorously to 
subsequent bottom-up input that matches the top-down prime . 
• Match: A cell can become active if it receives large convergent bottom-up and top-down 
inputs. Such a matching process can generate cirhanced activation as resonance takes 
hold. 
• Mismatch: A cell is suppressed even if it receives a large bottom-up input if it also 
receives only a sma.ll, or zero, top-down expectation input. 
I clairn that this Alri' matching rule and the resonance rule that it implies operate in 
all the cxa.mples that I have previously sketched, and do so to solve the stability-plasticity 
dilernrna. All the examples arc proposed to illustrate how we can continue to learn rapidly 
and stably about new experiences throughout life by matching bottorn-up :;ignal patterns 
from rnore peripheral to more central brain processing stages against top-down signal pat-
terns from more centra.] to more peripheral processing stages. 'l'hese top-clown signals repre-
sent the brain's learned expectations of what the bottorn-up signal patterns should be based 
upon past experience. 'I'he matching procesr: is cler:igncd to reinforce and amplify those 
combinations of feature:; in the bottom-up pattern that arc consistent with the top-clown 
expectations, and to suppre:;s tlro:;e features that arc inconsistent,. 'I'hi:; top-down matching 
step initiates the proce:;s whereby the brain selectively P''YS attention to expcricmccs that 
it expects, binds thenr into coherent internal representations through resonant states, and 
incorporates them through learning into its lmowlcdgc about the world. 
Given that such a resonant matching process occurs in the brain, how doe:; the brain react 
when there is a. rnisrnatch situation? The AH1' rnatching rule suggests that a big enough 
mi:;rnatch between a bottom-up input and a top-clown expectation can rapidly attenuate 
activity at the matching level. 'l'hi:o collapse of bottom-up activation can initiate a rapid 
reset: of activily at both the matching level itself and at tire sub:;cqucnt levels that it feeds, 
thereby initiating a nrenrory search for a rnore appropriate recognition category or creating 
a new one. 
Resonant Dynamics During Speech Categorization 
Many examples of such a reset event occur during variable-rate speech perception. As one 
exarnple, consider how people hear combinations of vowels (V) and consonants (C) in VG CV 
sequences. Bruno Repp at Haskins Laboratories has studied perception of the sequences [ib] 
[ga] and [ib] [ba] when the silence interval between the initial VC syllable and the terminal 
CV syllable i:; varied (Rcpp, 1980). lf the silence interval is :ohort enough, then [ib] [ga] 
sounds like [iga] a.ncl [ib]·[ba.] sounds like [iba]. Repp ran a. number of condition:;, leading to 
the several data curves displayed in Figure 4. The main point for present purposes is thai: 
the transition frorn a percept of [iba] to one of [ib] [ba] occurs after 100 150 milliseconds 
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more silence than the transition from [iga] to [ib]-[ga]. One hundred milliseconds is a very 
long time relative to the time scale a.t which individual neurons can be activated. Why is 
this shift so large? 
My colleagues la.n Boarchnan, Michael Cohen, and I have quantitatively simulated these 
data using a rnoclel, called the AHTPHONE model, of how a resonant wave develops clue 
to bottom-up a.nd top-down signal exchanges between a working memory that represents 
the individual speech items and a list categorization network that groups them together 
into learned language units, or chunks (Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997). We have 
shown how a mismatch between [g] and [b] rapidly resets the working memory if the silence 
between them is short enough, thereby preventing the [b] sound from reaching resonance 
and consciousness, as in Figure 5. We ha.vc also shown how the development of a previous 
resonance involving [b] can resonantly fuse with a subsequent [b] sound to greatly extend the 
perceived duration of [iba.] across a silence interval between [ib] and [ba]. Figure 6A illus-
trates this property by suggesting how the second presenta.tion of [b] can quickly reactivate 
the resonance in response to the first presentation of [b] before the resonance stops. This 
phenomenon uses the property that it takes longer for the first presentation of [b] to reach 
resonance tha.n it does for the second presentation of [b] to inlhwnce the rna.intenance of this 
resonance. 
If, however, [ib] can fuse across time with [ba], then how do we ever hear distinct [ib]-[ba.] 
sounds when the silence gets long enough? Much evidence suggests that after a. resonance 
fully develops, it spontaneously collapses after awhile due to a. habitua.tive process that goes 
on in the pathways that maintain the resonance via bottom-up and top-clown signals. Thus, 
if the silence is long enough for resonant collapse of [ib] to occur, then a. distinguishable [ba] 
resonance can subsequently develop and be heard, as in Figure CiB. 
Such a. habitua.tive process has also been used to explain rnany other da.ta. about percep-
tion, learning, and recognition, notably data. about the reset of visual, cognitive, or motor 
representations in response to rapidly changing events. Relevant visual data include proper-
ties of light adaptation, visual persistence, aftere[ccts, residual traces, and apparent motion 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1981; Francis and Grossberg, 1996a, 199Gb; Francis, Grossberg, 
and Mingolla, 1994). Abbott ct al. (HJ97) have recently reported data from visual cortex 
that they modeled using the same ha.bituative law that was used in all of these applications. 
At bottom, such a. babituative law is predicted to be found so ubiquitously across brain 
systems because it helps to rapidly reset and rebalance neural circuits in response to rapidly 
changing input conditions, notably as part of an opponent process (Grossberg, 1980). 
'I'hc Repp (J 980) data. illustrate the important fact that the duration of a consciously 
perceived interval of silence is sensitive to the phonetic context into which the silence is 
placed. 'l'hesc data show that the phonetic context can generate a conscious percept of 
continuous sound across 150 milliseconds of silence- that can be heard a.s silence in a. difFerent 
phonetic context. Our explanation of these data in tenns of the rnaintenance of resonance 
in one case, but its rapid reset in another, is consistent with a simple, but revolutionary, 
clelinition of silence: Silence is a. tcmpora.l discontinuity in the rate with which the auditory 
resonance evolves in tirne. Various other rnodcls of speech perception, having no concept like 
resonance on which to build, cannot begin to explain data. of this type. Several such nroclcls 
arc reviewed in Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen (1997). 
Figure 6 
If, however, [ib] can fuse across time with [ba], then how do we ever hear distinct [ib]--[ba.] 
sounds when the silence gets long enough? Much evidence suggests tha.t a.fter a resonance 
[ully develops, it spontaneously collapses after awhile clue to a habituativc process that goes 
on in the pathways that maintain the resonance via bottorn-up and top-clown signals. 'I'hus, 
if the silence is long enough for resonant collapse of [ib] to occur, then a distinguishable [ba] 
resonance can subsequently develop and be heard, as in Figure 6B. 
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Figure 4. 'l'hc left-hand curves represent the probability, under several experimental con-
ditions, that the subject will hear [ib]-[ga] rather than [iga.]. The right-hand cmves do the 
same for [ib] [ba] rather than the fused percept [iba]. Note that the perception of [iba] can 
occur at a silence inter.val between [ib] and [baj that is up to 150 milliseconds longer than the 
one that leach: to the percept [iga] instead of ib]--[ga]. (Data are reprinted with permission 
from B. H. Repp (1980), Haskins Laboratories Status Report on Speech Research, SR-61, 
151 165.) 
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Figure 5, (A) Response to a single stop, such as [b] or [g], with and without resonance. 
Suprathreshold activation is shaded. (B) Reset due to phonologic rnisrnatch between [ib] 
and [ga]. 
Such a. habituative process has also been used to explain many other data about percep-
tion, learning, and recognition, notably data. aJJout the reset of vioua.l, cognitive, or motor 
rcpreoentationo in response to rapidly changing events. H.eleva.nt vioua.l data include proper-
ties of light adaptation, visual persistence, a.ftereffecto, residua.! traces, and a.ppa.rent motion 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1981; Francis and Grossberg, 1996a, 199Gb; Francis, Grossberg, 
and Mingolla., 1994). Abbott ct al. (1997) ba.ve recently reported data. from vioua.l cortex 
that. they rnodeled using the sarne ha.bituative law that was used in all of these applications. 
At bottom, such a. ha.bituative la.w is predicted to be found so ubiquitously across brain 
systems because it helps to rapidly reset and rebalance neural circuits in response to rapidly 
changing input conditions, notably as part of an opponent process (Grossberg, 1980). 
'J'he Rcpp (1980) data illustrate the important fact tha.t tlw duration of a consciously 
perceived interval of silence is sensitive to the phonetic context into which the silence is 
placed. 'l'hcsc data show that the phonetic context can generate a conscious percept of 
continuou:o sound across 150 milliseconds of silence ··that ca.n be heard a:o silence in a different 
phonetic context. Our explanation of these data in terms of the rna.intenance of resonance 
in one case, but its rapid reset in another, is consi0tent with a simple, but revolutionary, 
definition of silence: Silence is a ternporal discontinuity in the rate with which the auditory 
resonance evolves in time. Various other models of speech perception, having no concept like 
resonance on which to build, cannot begin to explain data of this type. Several such models 
arc reviewed in Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen (1997). 
Resonant Dynamics During Auditory Streaming 
A similar type of resonant processing helps to explain cocktail party separation of dis-
tinct voices into auditory streams, as in the auditory continuity illusion of Figure 2. 'I'his 
process goes on, however, at earlier stages of auditory processing than speech catcgoriza.· 
tion. My colleagues Krishna Govindarajan, Lonce Wyoe, Michael Cohen, and I have devel-
oped a model, called the ARl'S'J'REAM model, of how distinguishable auditory streams are 
resonantly formed and separated (Grossberg, 1998b; Govinda.raja.n, Grossberg, Wyse, and 
Cohen, 1995). Here the two main processing levels (Figure 7) arc a spectral stream level 
at which the frequencies of the sound spectrum are represented across a spatial map, and 
a. pitch stream level at which pitch nodes respond to the harmonics at the spectral stream 
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Figure 6. (A) Fu;;ion in response to proxirnal sirnilar phones. (H) Perceptual silence allows 
a 2-;;top percept. 
level that comprise a given pitch. After the auditory signa,! is preprocessed, its ;;pcctral, or 
frequency, components are redundantly represented in multiple :;pectraJ streams; that i0, the 
sound's preproccooecl frequency components are reprc:;entcd in multiple spatial maps, each 
one of which can subscrvc the percept of a particular auditory stream. 
Each of these spectral strearns is filtered by bot torn-up 0ignals that activate its own pitch 
stream representation at the pitch stream level; that is, there are multiple pitch streams, one 
corre;;poncling to every spectral :;tream. T'his rnnltiple repre;;entation of a sound's Bpectral 
cornponents and pitch interact to break up the entire sound strearn that i;; entering the system 
into distinct acoustic: sources or voices. This happens as follow;;. A given sound spectrum 
is multiply represented at all the spectral strcan1s and then redundantly activates all of the 
pitch nodes that arc consistent with theBe sounds. 'l'lrcsc pitch representations conrpete to 
select a winner, which inhibits the representation;; of the same pitch acro:;s streams, while 
also sending top-clown rnatching signa.ls back to the ;;pectral stream level. By the AWl' 
matching rule, tbc frequency components that are con;;istent with the winning pitch node 
are amplified, and all others arc suppressed, thereby leading to a spectral-pitch resonance 
within the stream of the winning pitch node. In this way, the pitch layer coherently binds 
together the hannonically related frequency components that correspond to a prescribed 
auditory source. All the frequency components that are suppres;;ed by Alrl' matching in 
this streanr arc freed to activate and resonate with a different pitch in a different strearn. 
The net rc:;ult is rnultiple resonances, each sclcctivc.ly grouping together into pitches those 
frequencies that correspond to distinct auditory sources. 
Using the Airl.'S'l'REAM model, we have ;;imulatcd rnany of basic ;;trearning percepts, 
including the auditory continuity illusion of Fignre 2. It occurs, l contend, because the 
spectral-stream resonance takes a time to develop that i;; commensurate to the duration of 
the sub;;cqucnt noi;;c. Once the tone reoonance develops, the second tone can quickly act to 
support and maintain it throughout the dnration of the noise, much as [ba] fuses with [ib] 
during perception of [iba]. Of course, for this to make sense, one needs to accept the fact 
that the tone resonance docs not start to get consciously heard until just about when the 
second tone occnrs. 
A Circuit for ART Matching 
Figure 7 incorporates one of the possible ways that Gail Carpenter and I proposed m 
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Figure 7. Block diagram of the AH1'S'I'REAM auditory streaming rnodcl. Note the non-
specific top-down inhibitory signa.ls from the pitch level to the spectra.! level that reali%e 
AHT matching within the network. 
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Figure 8. One way to realize the Alt:f matching rule using top-clown activation of non-· 
specific inhibitory intcrneurons, as in Figure 8. Several mathematically possible alternative 
ways a.re suggested in the Appendix of G.A. Carpenter and S. Grossberg (1987a.). 
the rnid-1980's for how the AirC matching rule ca.n be realized (Carpenter and Gro0sberg, 
1987a.). This matching circuit i0 reclrmvn in Figure 8 for clarity. It is perhaps the simplest 
such circuit, and I lmve found it in subsequent studies to be the one that is implicated by 
data time and time again. 
In this circuit, bottonHrp signals to the spectra.] stream level can excite their target 
nodes if top-down signals are not active. 'fop-clown signals try to excite those spectral, or 
frequency component, nodes that arc consistent with the pitch node that activa.te0 therr1. By 
thmnoclveo, top-down 0ignal0 fail to activate spectral nodes becanse the pitch node also ac-
tivates a pitch summaJ.ion layer that nonopecifica1ly inhibits all spectral nodes in its stream. 
The nonspecific top-down inhibition hereby prevents the specific top-down excitation from 
supraliminally activating any spectral nodes. On the other band, when excitatory bottonl-
up and top-down signals occm together, then those spectral nodes that. receive both types 
of signals can be fully activated. All other nodes in that stream arc inhibited, including 
spectral nodes that were previously activated by bottom-up signals but received no subse-
quent top-down pitch snpport. Attention hereby selectively activates consistent nodes while 
nonselectively inhibiting all other nodes in a stream. 
How Early Does Attention Act in the Brain? 
11. has elassically been thonght that attention first acts at higher levels of cortical orga-
nization. ln vision, l'or example, it was thought that attention occurred no earlier than the 
extrastriate visual cortex (McAdams and Ma.unsell, 1997; ]\;[ott.er, 1991a, J 991b; Reynolds 
ct, a.l., 1995). However, recent experiments have suggested that attentional modulation can 
occnr in primary visual cortex (VI), and even at the earlier Lateral Geniculate Nucleus via 
top-down cortico-geniculate pathways (Hup6 et 111., 1997; Ito, Wcstheimcr, and Gilbert, 1997; 
Johnson and Burkhalter, HJ97; Lamme, Zipscr, and Spekreijse, 1997; Press and van Essen, 
1997). Is there a contradiction here? 'I'he answer depends upon how you define attention. If 
attention refers only to processes that can be controlled voluntarily, then corticogeniculate 
feedback, being autornatic, may not qualify. On the other hand, such top-down feedback 
does appear to have the selective properties of an "automatic" attention process, even at the 
earliest stages of sensory processing. 
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Is there direct experimental evidence for the prediction that corticogeniculate feedback 
supporto ART matching and resonance? In a remarkable 1994 Nature article, Sillito and his 
colleagues (Sillito et al., 19911) published neurophysiological data that strikingly support this 
prediction. 'I'hey wrote in particular that "cortically induced correlation of relay cell activity 
produces coherent firing in those groups of relay cells with receptive field alignments appro-
priate to signal the particular orientation of the moving contour to the cortex ... this increases 
the gain of the input for feature-linked events detected by the cortex ... the cortico-thalamic 
input is only strong enough to exert an effect on those dLGN cells that are additionally 
polarized by their retinal input... the feedback circuit searches for correlations that support 
the 'hypothesis' represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity". In short, Sillito 
verified all the properties of the AHT matching rule. 
Attention at All Stages of Sensory and Cognitive Neocortex? 
It has, in fact, been suggested how similar automatic attcntional processes are integrated 
within the laminar circuits of visual cortex, notably the circuits of cortical areas V1 a.ncl V2 
that are used to generate perceptual groupings, such as the illusory contours in Figure 1 
(Grossberg, 1998a.). In this proposal, the ART Matching Rule is realized as follows. 'lop-
down atl.ent.ional feedback from cortica.l a.rca V2 to Vl is predicl.ed to be mediated by signa.ls 
from layer 6 of cortical area V2. These top-clown signals attention ally prime layer 4 of cortical 
area V1 via. an on-center off-surround network within Vl from layer 6 to lityer 11. In this 
conception, layer 6 of V2 activates layer 6 of VI, possibly via a multisyna.ptic pathway via. 
layers I and 5. Layer 6 then activates layer 4 of VI via. an on-center off-surround network 
from layer 6-to-4. This analysis predicts that the layer G-to-'J on-center circuit can prime, 
or modula.ie, layer 4 cells, but cannot fully activate them, because the top-down atl.entiona.l 
prime, acting by itself, is subliminal. Such a 1nodulatory eliect is achieved by appropriately 
balancing the strength of the on-center and off-surround signals within the layer 6-to-1 
network. 
Related modeling work has shown how such balanced on-center off-surround signals can 
lead to self-stabilizing clevelop1nent of the horizontal connections within layers 2j:l of VI and 
V2 that subserve perceptua.l grouping (Grossberg and Williamson, 1997, 1998). It has also 
been shown how the top-down on-center off-surround circuit from area Vl to LGN can self-
stabilize the development of disparity-sensitive complex cells in area Vl (Grunewald and 
Grossberg, 1998). Other modeling work has suggested how a similar top-clown on-center 
off-surround automa.tical attentiona.l circuit from cortical area MS'l' to Jvl'l' can be used to 
generate coherent representations of the direction and speed with which objects move ( Chey, 
Grossberg, and lVlingolla, 1997). 'I'aken together, these studies show how the AHT Matching 
Rule rnay be realized in known cortical circuits, and how it can self-stabilize cleveloprnent 
of these circuits as a precursor to its role in self-stabilizing learning throughout life. Gross-
berg (l998a) bas predicted that the san1e ART' rnatching circuit exists within the laminar 
organization that is found universally in all sensory and cognitive neocortex, including the 
variom exa.mples of auditory processing that arc reviewed above. This prediction does not, 
of course, deny that these various circuits may be specialized in various ways to process the 
difFerent types of infonnation with which they are confronted. 
Given that the cortical organization of top-down on-center off-surround attention a.! prim-
ing circuits scen1 t.o be ubiquitous in visual cortex, and by extension in other types of cortex, 
it is important to ask: What more docs the brain need to aclcl in order to generate a more 
flexible, task-dependent type of attention switching? This question leads us to consider vi-
sual object recognition, and how it breaks clown during nredial temporal amnesia .. Various 
other models of object recognition, a.nd their conceptual and explanatory weaknesses relative 
to AHT, arc reviewed in Grossberg and Merrill (1996). 
Self-Organizing Feature Maps for Learned Object Recognition 
Let us begin with a two-level network tha.t illustrates some of the rnam ideas m t.hc 
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simplest possible way. Level F1 in Figure 9 contains a network of nodes, or cell populations, 
each of which is activated by a particular combination of sensory features via inputs. Level 
F2 contains a network of nodes that represent recognition codes, or categories, which are 
selectively activated by the activation patterns across F1. Each F1 node sends output signals 
to a subset of F2 nodes. Each F2 node thus receives inputs frorn many F1 nodes. 'I'he thick 
bottom-up pathway from F1 to F2 in Figure 9 represents in a concise wa.y an array of diverging 
and converging pathways. Let learning take place a.t the synapses denoted by semicircular 
endings in the F1 _, F2 pathways. Pathways that end in arrowheads do not undergo learning. 
This bottom-up learning enables F2 category nodes to become selectively tuned to particular 
combinations of activation patterns across F1 feature detectors by changing their LTM traces. 
Why is not bottom-up learning sufficient in a. system that can autonomously solve the 
Btability-pla.sticity dilemma.? Why a.rc learned top-down expectations also needed? 'J'o un-
derstand this, we consider a type of model that is often called a self-organizing feature map, 
competitive learning, or learned vector quantization. This type of rnodel shows how to 
combine associative learning and lateral inhibition for purposes of learned categorization. 
In such a model, as shown in Figure lOA, an input pattern registero itself as a pattern of 
activity, or ST'M, across the feature detectors of level F1. Each F1 output signal i0 multiplied 
or gated, by the adaptive weight, or r:rM trace, in ito respective pathway. All these Iil'M-
gated inputs are added up at their ta.rgct F2 nodes. The LTM traces hereby filter the 
STM signal pattern and generate larger inputs to those F2 nodes whose LTM patterns are 
rnost similar to the STM pattern. Lateral inhibitory, or competitive, interactions within 
F2 contrast-enhance this input pattern. Whereas many h nodes may receive inputs from 
F.1, lateral inhibition allows a rnuch smaller set of F2 nodes to store their activation in 
STM. T'hese are the h nodes whose Ll'M pa.t.tems are most similar to the ST'M pattern. 
'I'hcse inhibitory interactions also tend to conserve the total activity that is stored in ST'M 
(Grossberg, 1982), thereby realizing an interference-based capacity limitation in S'I'M. 
Only the F2 nodes that win the cornpl~tition and store their activity in S'I'lVI can influence 
the learning process. S'I'M activity opens a learning gate a.t the I:I'M traces that abut the 
winning nodes. 'J'hesc Ll'M traces c.a.n then approach, or track, the input signals in their 
pathways, a. process called steepest descent. 'I'his learning la.w is thus often called gated 
steepest descent, or instar learning. T'hiB type of learning tunes the winning LTM patterns 
to become even more sirnilar to the STM pattern, and to thereby enable the STM pattern 
to more effectively activate the corresponding F 2 nodes. I introduced this learning la.w 
into neural network rnodel0 in the 1960's (e.g. Grossberg, 1969), and into i\IlL' modch; in 
the 1970's (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1980). Such an L'I'M trace can either increase 
(Hebbia.n) or decrease (anti-Hebbian) to track the signa.ls in its pathway ('I'able 1). It, has 
been used to model neurophysiological data about learning in the hippocampus (also called 
long term potentiation and long term depression) and about adaptive tuning of cortical 
feature detectors during early visual development (Artola a.nd Singer, J 99:3; Levy, 1985, 
Levy and Desmond, 1985, Ranschecker and Singer, 1979; Singer, 198:3), thereby lending 
support to ARI' predictions that these systems would employ this type of learning. 
Self-organizing feature rnap models were introduced and computationally charactc~rized 
by Christoph von der Malsburg and myself during the J 970's (Grossberg, 1972, 1976a, 1978; 
von der Malsburg, HJ73; Willshaw and Malsburg, J 976). These models were subsequently 
applied and further developed by many authors, notably T'euvo Kohoncn (Kohonen, 198tl). 
They exhibit many useful properties, especially if not too many input patterns, or clusters 
of input patterns, perturb level F1 relative to the number of categorizing nodes in level F2. I 
proved that, under these sparse environmental conditions, category learning is stable in the 
sense that its r:rlvl traces converge to fixed values as learning trials proceed. In addition, 
the I:I'M traces track the Btatistics of the environment, arc self-normalizing, and oscillate 
a minimum number of times (Grossberg, 1976a). Also, the category selection rule, like a 
Bayesian classifier, tends to minimize error. I also proved, however, that under a.rbitra.1y 
17 
January-{, 1999 
ATTENTIONAL 
SUBSYSTEM 
ST lVI 
+ 
+ 
Nonspecific STM inhibitory 
gain control 
F 2 
+ 
1\: 
i l 
.. 1:-
INPUT 
ORIENTING 
SUBSYSTEM 
A 
Reset 
and 
Search 
Matching 
criterion: 
vigilance 
pammetor 
+ 
Figure 9, An exa.mple of a. model AHT' circuit in which attentional and orienting circuits 
interact Level :F1 encodes a distributee! representation of an event by a short term rncrnory (STM) activation pattern across a network of feature detectors, Level F 2 encodes the event 
using a cornpressecl STlvl representation of the :F1 pattern. Learning of these recognition 
codes occurs at the long term memory (!:I'M) traces within the bottom-up and top-down 
pathways between levels .F1 and .Fz. The top-down pathways read-out learned expectations 
whose prototypes are matched against bottorn-up input patterns at .F1• The size of Jnis-
rnatches in response to novel events arc evaluated relative to the vigilance parameter p of 
the orienting subsystern A. A large enough mismatch resets the recognition code that is 
active in STM at .F2 and initiates a memory search for a more appropriate recognition code. 
Output frorn subsystem A can also trigger an orienting response. (A) Block diagram of cir-
cuit. (B) Individual pathways of circuit, including the input level .Fo that generates inputs 
to lcvel.F1 . 'I'he ga.in control input g1 to lcvcl.F1 helps to instantiate the matching rule (sec 
text). Gain control g2 to lcvel.F2 is needed to instate a category in S'I'M. 
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Figure 10. ART' search !'or a recognition code: (A) 'I'hc input pattern I is instated across 
the feature detectors at level F1 as a short tcnn 1nenrory (S'I'M) activity pattern X. Input 
I also nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem A; sec Figure 1. S'T'M pattern X 
is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1. Pattern X both inhibits .A and generates 
the output pattern S. Pattern S is multiplied by long term rnernory (L'l'M) traces and 
a.clclccl at Fz nodes to form the input pattern T, which activates the STM pattern Y across 
the recognition categories coded at level F2. (B) Pattern Y generates the top-down output 
pattern U which is multiplied by to1Hlown ];I'M tra.ecs and added at F 1 noclc.s to form 
the prototype pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active F2 nodes. If 
V rnismatches I at F 1, then a new S'I'M activity pattern X* is generated at F1 . X* is 
represented by the hatched pattern. It includes the features of I that arc confinncd by V. 
Inactivated nodes corresponding to unconfinncd features of X arc unhatched. 'J'he reduction 
in total STM activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* cames a. decrea.sc in the 
total inhibition from F 1 to A. (C) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, A releases a nonspecific 
arousal wave to F 2 , which resets the S'l'M pattern Y at :F2. (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-
down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at F 1. Enduring traces of the 
prior reset lead X to activate a different S'I'M pattern Y* at F 2. If the top-clown prototype 
clue to Y* also mismatches I at F1, then the search for an appropriate F2 code continues 
until a rnore appropriate F2 representation is selected. Then an attentive resonance develops 
and learning of the attended data is initiated. [Reprinted with permission from Carpenter 
and Grossberg (1993).] 
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Case 1 
State of S i + 
State of x j + 
State of w ij t 
+ = active 
-= inactive 
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
-
+ 
t 
+ -
- -
~~ ~---
t = increase 
~ = decrease 
~ = no change 
Table 1. 'l'he instar learning, or gated steepest descent learning rule, embodies both IIcb-
bia.n (lilT) and anti-Hebbia.n (l:rD) properties within a. single process. (Reprinted with 
pcrmi;;sion from Grossberg and Merrill, I 996). 
environmental conditions, learning becomes unstable (Grossberg, 1976b). Such a model 
could forget your parents' faces when it learns a. new lace. Although a. gradual switching 
off of plasticity can partially ovcrconre this problem, such a. mechanism cannot work in a 
learning system whose pla.;;ticity is rna.inta.inecl throughout adulthood. 
This memory instability is due to basic properties of associative learning and lateral 
inhibition, which arc two processes that occur ubiquitously in the brain. An ana.lysi;; of this 
instability, together with data about hurnan and a.nirna.l categorization, conditioning, and 
a.U.ention, led me to introduce: AHT rnodds to stabilize the rncrnory of self-organizing feature 
rna.ps in reoponse to an arbitrary stream of input patterns. 
How Does ART Stabilize Learning of a Self-Organizing Feature Map'? 
How docs an Airr model prevent such in:otabilitie:o frorn developing? As noted above, in 
an ART' model, learning doc:,; not occur when wmc winning F 2 activities arc stored in S'I'M. 
Instead, activation of F2 nodes rnay be interpreted as "making a hypothesis" about an input 
at F 1. When F2 is activated, it quickly generates an output pattern that i:o tran:omittcd along 
the top-down adaptive pathways from F2 to F 1 . T'lwse top-down signals arc multiplied in 
their respective pathway:,; by L'J'M traces at the scrnicircular :oynaptic knobs of Figure lOB. 
'fhc l:l'M-gated signals fronr all the active F2 nodc:o arc acldcd to generate the total top-clown 
feedback pattern from F2 to F 1. It is this pattern that plays the role of a learned expectation. 
Activation of this expectation rnay be interpreted as "Lc:oting the hypothesis", or "reading 
out the prototype"., of the active F2 category. As shown in Figure lOB, AHT networks arc 
designed to match the "expected prototype" of the category against the bottom-up input 
pattern, or excrnplar, to F 1. Nodes that are activated by this exemplar arc suppressed if they 
do not correspond to large r;rM traces in the top-down prototype pattern. The resultant 
F 1 pattern encodes the cluster of input features that the network deems relevant to the 
hypothesis based upon its past experience. 'I'his resultant activity pattern, called X* in 
Figure JOB, encodes the pattern of features to which the network "pays attention". 
H the expectation is close enough to the input exemplar, then a. state of resonance de-
velops a.s the attentional focus takes hold. T'he pattern X* of attended features reactivates 
the F2 category Y which, in turn, reactivates X* 'fhc network locks into a resonant state 
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through a positive feedback loop that dynarnically links, or binds, X* with Y. 'I'he reso-
nance binds spatially distributed features into either a :>table equilibrium or a synchronous 
oscillation, rnuch like the synchronous feature binding in visual cortex that has recently at-
tracted so much interest after the experiments of Reinhard Eckhorn, Wolf Singer, and their 
colleagues (Eckhorn el: al., 1988; Gray and Singer, 1989); also sec Grossberg and Grunewald 
(1997). 
In AH'I', the rc:;onant :;tate, rather than bottorn-up activation, is predicted to drive 
the learning process. 'I'he resonant state persists long enough, at a high enough activity 
level, to activate the slower learning processes in the r:rM trace:;. 'I'his helps to explain 
how the r:rlvl traces can regulate the brain's fast information processing without necessarily 
learning about the signals that they proce:>s. Through resonance as a mediating event, the 
combination of top-down matching and attcntional focusing helps to stabili"e AH.T learning 
and memory in response to a.n arbitrary input environment. 'I'he stabilizing properties of 
top-clown matching may be one reason for the ubiquitous occurrence of reciprocal bottom-up 
and top-clown cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic interactions in the brain. 
How is the Generality of Knowledge Controlled? 
A key problem about consciousne:;s concerns what combinations of features or other 
information arc bound together into object or event representations. AHT provides a new 
answer to this question that overcomes problems faced by earlier models. In particular, ARI' 
systerns learn prototypes, rather than exemplars, because the attended feature vector X*, 
rather than the input exemplar itself, is learned. Both the bottom-up LTM traces that tunc 
the category nodes and the top-clown r;rM traces that filter the learned expectation learn to 
correlate activation of :F2 nodes with the set. of all attended X* vecl.ors that they have ever 
experienced. 'I'hcsc attended S'I'M vectors assign less S'I'M activity to features in the input 
vector I that mismatch the learned top-down prototype V than to features l.lmt match V. 
Civcn that AHT systems learn prototypes, how can they also learn to rccogni~c unique 
experiences, such a.s a particular view of a friend's face? The prototypes learned by AH'I' 
systerns accornplish this by realizing a qualitatively different concept of prototype than that 
offered by previous rnodels. In particular, Gail Carpenter and I have shown with our students 
how A HT prototypes form in a way that is designed to conjointly rnaximizc category gen-
eralization while rninimiy,ing predictive error (Braclski and Grossberg, 1995; Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1987a, 1987b; Carpenter, Grossberg and Reynolds, 1991; Carpenter, Grossberg, 
Markuzon, H.eynolcls, and Rosen, 1992). As a result,/\!(]' prototypes can autmnatically learn 
individual exemplars when environmental conditions require highly selective discrirninations 
to be made. How the matching process achieves this is discussed below. 
Before describing how this is achieved, let us note what happens if the mismatch between 
bottom-up and top-clown inforrnation is too great for a resonance to develop. 'J'hen the 
:12 category is quickly reset and a memory search for a better category is initiated. T'his 
cornbination of top-clown matching, attention focusing, ancl mernory search i0 what stabilizes 
Airi' learning and rncrnory in an arbitrary inpnt environrncnt. The attcntionaJ focusing by 
top-clown matching prevents inpnts that represent irrelevant features at :F1 from eroding the 
rnernory of previously learned LT'M prototypc:s. In addition, the rnernory search resets :F2 
categories so quickly when their prototype V misrnatches the inpnt vector I that the rnorc 
slowly varying I:I'M traces clo not have an opportunity to correlate the attended :F1 activity 
vector X* with them. Conversely, the resonant event, when it doe:; occnr, maintains and 
a.mplifies the matched STM activities for long enough and at high enough amplitudes for 
learning to occur in the L'I'M traces. 
Whether or not a resonance occurs depends upon the level of rnismatch, or novelty, that 
the network is prepared to tolerate. Novelty is measured by how well a given exernplar 
matches the prototype that its presentation evokes. The criterion of an acceptable match 
is cleilnecl by an internally controlled pa.rarnctcr that Carpenter and I have called vigilance 
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(Carpenter and Grossberg, l987a). 'T'he vigilance parameter is computed in the orienting 
subsystem A; see Figure 9. Vigilance weighs how similar a.n input exemplar I must be to a 
top-down prototype V in order for resonance to occur. Resonance occurs if pJII- JX* 1 ::; 0. 
This inequa.lity says that the F1 attentiona.l focus X* inhibits A more than the input I excites 
it. If A remains quiet, then an F1 ~ F2 resonance can develop. 
Either a larger value of p or a srna.ller match ratio JX*JIIJ-1 makes it harder to satisfy 
the resonance inequality. When p grows so large or JX*JJIJ-1 is so small that pJIJ-IX*J > 0, 
then A generates an arousal burst, or novelty wave, that resets the ST!Vl pattern across F 2 
and initiates a bout of hypothesis testing, or memory search. During se<trch, the orientinp; 
subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem (Figures lOC and lOD) to rapidly reset 
mismatched categories and to select better F 2 representations with which to categorize novel 
events at F 1, without risking unsclective forgetting of previous knowledp;e. Search ma.y select 
a familiar category if its prototype is similar enough to the input to satisfy the resonance 
criterion. 'I'he prototype may then be refined by attentiona.l focusing. lf the input is too 
different from any previously learned prototype, then an uncomrnitted population of :12 cells 
is selected and learning of a new category is initiated. 
Because vigilance can vary across learning trials, recognition categories capable of encod-
ing widely differing degrees of generalization or abstraction can be learned by a single Aitr 
system. Low vigilance leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. High vigilance 
leads to narrow generalization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exemplars, even 
a single exemplar. 'I'hus a single AH'I' system may be used, say, to learn abstract prototypes 
with which to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as "exemplar proto-
types" with which to recognize individual faces and clogs. A single system can learn both, as 
the need arises, by increasing vigilance just enough to activate .A if a previous categorization 
leads to a predictive error. 'I'hus the contents of a conscious percept can be modifred by 
environmentally sensitive vigilance control. 
Vigilance control hereby allows AHT to overcornc sorne fmrdamcntal diflkulties that have 
been faced by classical exemplar and prototype theories of learning and recognition. Classical 
exemplar models face a serious combinatorial explosion, 0ince they need to suppose tha.t all 
experienced exemplars are somehow stored in memory and searched during performance. 
Classical prototype theories face the problem that they find it hard to explain how individual 
exemplars arc learned, such as a particular view of a familiar face. Vigilance control enables 
A ltJ' to achieve the best of both types of rnodel, by selecting the rnost general category 
that is consistent with enviromnenta.l feedback. If that category is an exernplar, then a 
"very vigilant" AH:I' model can leanr it. If the category is at an intcrrncdiatc level of 
gencrali~ation, then the AHT model can learn it by hiwing the vigilance value track the 
level of match bet.wcen the current exemplar and the prototype that it activates. In every 
instance, the model tries to learn the rnost general category that is consistent with the data. 
This tendency can, for example, lead to the type of overgencra.liza.tion that is seen in young 
children until further learning leads to category refinement (Chaprnan e(; aJ., 1986; Clark, 
197:l; Smith ci al., 1985; Smith and Kemler, 1978; Ward, 1983). Many benchmark studies of 
how AHI' uses vigilance control to classify cornplex data. bases have shown that the nurnber 
of ARr categories that is learned scales well with the cornplexity of the input data; sec 
Carpenter a.ncl Grossberg (19~H) for a list of illustrative benchmark studies. 
Corticohippocampal Interactions and Medial Temporal Amnesia 
As sequences of input;; arc practiced over learning trial;;, the search process eventually 
converges upon stable categories. Carpenter and l mathcrnatically proved (Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1987a) that familiar inputs directly access the category whose prototype provides 
the globally best match, while rmfarniliar inputs engage the orienting subsystem to trigger 
memory searches for better categories until they become farniliar. 'I'his process continues 
until the memory capacity, which can be chosen arbitrarily large, is fully utili~ed. 'fhe 
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process whereby search is automatically disengaged is a form of memory consolidation that 
emerges from network interactions. Emergent consolidation does not preclude structural 
consolidation at individual cells, since the amplified and prolonged activities that subserve a. 
resonance may be a trigger for learning-dependent cellular processes, such as protein synthesis 
and transmitter production. It has also been shown that the adaptive weights which are 
learned by an AHT model at any stage of learning can be translated into IF-THEN rules 
(e.g., Carpenter ci a.l., .1992). Thus the An:r model is a. self-organizing rule-discovering 
production system as well as a neural network. 
The attentional subsystem of An:r has been used to model aspects of inferotemporal 
(IT') cortex, and the orienting subsystem models part of the hippocampal systern. 'I'he in-
terpretation of AHT dynamics in terrns of rr cortex led Miller, Li, and Desimone (1991) 
to successfully test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each trial 
in a working memory task. To illustrate the implications of a.n An:r interpretation of IT-
hippocampal interactions, 1 will review how a lesion of the AHT model's orienting subsystem 
creates a. formal memory disorder with symptorns much like the medial temporal amnesia 
that is caused in animals and human patients after hippocampal system lesions (Carpen-
ter and Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). In particular, such a lesion in vivo 
causes unlimited anterograde amnesia.; limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; 
tendency to learn the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including per-
severative reactions; normal priming; and normal information processing of familiar events 
(Cohen, 1984; Gra.f, Squire, and Mandler, 1984; Lynch, McGaugh, and Weinberger, 1984; 
Squire and Butters, 1984; Squire and Cohen, 1984; Warrington and Wciskrantz, 19711; Zola-
Morgan and Squire, 1990). 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia. occurs because the network cannot carry out the memory 
search to learn a new recognition code. Limited retrograde amnesia occurs because familiar 
events can directly access correct recognition codes. Before events become familiar, memory 
consolidation occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystcrn (Figure 10C). 'I'his failure of con-
solidation does not necessarily prevent learning per se. Instead, learning inAuences the first. 
recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, rnuch as amnesics arc particularly 
strongly wedded to the fll'st response they learn. Perseverativc reactions can occur because 
the orienting subsystem cannot reset sensory representation;; or top-clown expectations that 
may be persistently mismatched by boti.orn-up cues. The inability to search mernory pre-
vents ARI' from discovering more appropriate stirnulus com.binations to attend. Normal 
priming occurs because it isrneclia.t.ccl by the attcntional subsystem. 
Sirnilar behavioral problems have been identified in hippoca.rnpcctornizccl monkeys. Ga.f-
fan (1985) noted tha.t fornix transection "impairs ability to change an established habit ... in 
a difFerent set of circumstances that is sirnila.r to the first a.ncl therefore liable to be confused 
with it.." In Alti', a defective orienting subsystem prevents the memory search whereby 
difFerent representations could be learned for similar events. Pribrarn (1986) called such a 
process a "competence for recombinant context-sensitive processing." These AHT mecha-
nisms illustrate how, as Zola.-Morga.n and Squire (1990) have reported, memory consolidation 
and novelty detection may be mediated by the same neural structures. Why hippocampcc-
tomizecl ra.ts have difficulty orienting to novel cues and why there is a progressive reduction 
in novelty--related hippocampal potentials as learning proceeds in norrnal rats is also clarified 
(Deadwyler, West, and Lunch, 1979; Deadwyler, West, and Robinson, 1981). In i\Kl', the 
orienting system is automatically disengaged as events become farnilia.r during the memory 
consolidation process. 'l'he AHT model of nonnal and a.bnorma.l recognition learning and 
memory is compared with several other recent models of the;;e phenomena in Grossberg and 
Merrill (1996). 
At this point, it might also be useful t.o note that. the processes of automatic and task-
selective attention may not be independent in vivo. This is because higher-order attent.ional 
constraints, that may be under task-selective control, can in principle propagate downwards 
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through successive cortical levels via layer 6-to-layer 6linkages. For example, recent modeling 
work has suggested how prestriatc cortical areas may separate visual objects from one another 
and from their backgrounds during the process of figure-ground separation (Grossberg, 1994, 
1997; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997). Such constraints may propagate top-down towards 
earlier cortical levels, possibly even area VI, to modulate the cells that get active there to be 
consistent with these figure-ground constraints. Still higher cortical processes, such as those 
involved in learned categorization, rna.y also propagate their rnodulatory constraints to lower 
levels. How the strength of such top-down modulatory influences depends upon the source 
cortical area. and on the number of synaptic steps to the target cortical area is a. topic that 
has yet to be systematically studied. 
How Universal are ART Processes in the Brain? 
In all the examples discussed above--from early vision, visual object recognition, audi-
tory streaming, and speech recognition AHT matching and resonance have played a central 
role in models that help to explain how the brain stabilizes its learned adaptations in re-
sponse to changing environmental conditions. This type of matching can be achieved using 
a top-clown nonspecific inhibitory gain control that down-regulates all target cells except 
those that also receive top-clown speciJ!c excitatory signals, as in Figure 8. Are there yet 
other brain processes that utili7,e these mechanisms? 
With my colleagues Mario Aguilar, Dan Bullock, and Karen Roberts, a. neural model 
has been developed to explain how the superior colliculus learns to use visual, auditory, 
somatosensory, and planned rnovement signals to control saccadic eye movements (Grossberg, 
Roberts, Aguilar, and Bullock, 1997). 'I'his rnodel use:; AH:I' matching and resonance to help 
explain behavioral and neural data. about multirnodal eye movement control. The model 
clarifies how visual, auditory, and planned movement signals use learning to form a mutually 
consistent movement rna.p, and how attention gets focused on a movement target location 
after all these signals compete to determine where the eyes will move. 
Nobuo Suga and his colleagues (Gao and Suga, 1998; Yan and Suga., 1998) have re-
cently reported nemophysiologica.! data showing how Alrt'-likc~ top-clown matching signa.!s 
can rnoclulate learning in the auditory system. 
H.cccnt experiments from Marcu:; Raichle's lab at Washington University using positron 
ernic;;;ion tomography (PE'l') support the idea that AH:r top-clown priming also occurs in 
human sonratosensory cortex (Drevets, Burton, and Raichlc, 1995 ). ln their experiments, 
attending to an irnpending stimulus to the lingers cau:;ccl inhibition of nearly cortical cells 
that code for the face, but not cells that code the Jlnp;ers. Likewise, priminp; of the toes 
produced inhibition of nearby cells that code for the fingers and face, but not cells that code 
for the toes. 
AHT rnoclcl:; have also been used to explain a great deal of data about cognitive-emotion a.! 
interactions, notably about classical a.ncl instrumental conditioning (Grossberg, 1987b) am! 
about !nun an decision making under risk (Grossberg and Gutowski, J 987). In these exarn pies, 
the resonances are between cognitive and crnotiona.l circuitc;, and help to focus attention 
upon, and release actions towards, valued events in the world. 
'J'hus all levels of vision, visual object rc~cognition, auditory preprocessing and strearning, 
speech recognition, attentive selection of eye movement tmgets, wrnatosensory representa-
tion, and cognitive-emotional interactions may all incorporate variants of the circuit depicted 
in Figure 8. These results suggest that a type of "automatic" attention oper:a.tcs even at 
early levels of brain processing, such as the lateral geniculate, but that higher proceasing 
levels benefit from an orienting subsystem that can be used to flexibly reset attention and 
to facilitate voluntary control of top-down expectations. 
Internal Fantasy, Planned Movement, and Volitional Gating 
Given this type of circuit, how could top-down priming be released from inhibition to 
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enable us to voluntarily experience internal thinking and fantasies? T'hi:; can be achieved 
through an "act of will" that activates inhibitory cells which inhibit the nonspecific inhibitory 
interneurons in the top-clown on-center off-surround network of Figure 8. 'I'his operation dis-
inhibits the cells receiving the excitatory top-clown signals in the on-center of the network. 
'l'hese cells are then free to generate supraliminal resonances. Such self-initiated resonances 
can, for example, be initiated by the read-out of top-down expectations from higher-order 
planning nodes into temporally organized working memories, say in the prefrontal cortex 
(Fuster, 1996). It is, for example, well-known that the basal ganglia can use such a clisin-
hibitory action to gate the release of individual rnovements, sequences of movements, and 
even cognitive processes (!Iikosalm, 1994; Middleton and Strick, 1994; Sakai et a.J., 1998) 
These examples also help to understand how top-clown expectations can be used for the 
control of planned (viz., intentional) behavioral sequences. For exarnple, once such planning 
nodes read-out their top-clown expectations into working memory, the contents of working 
memory can be read-out and modified by on-line change;, in "act;, of will". 'I'hcse volitional 
;,ignaJs enable invariant representations of an intentional behavior to rapidly adapt them-
selves to changing environmental condition;,. For example, Bullock, Grossberg, and lV!annes 
(1993) have modeled how such a working memory can control the intentiona.l performance 
of handwriting whose size and speed can be modified by acts of will, without a change of 
handwritten fonn. Bullock, Grossberg, and Guenther (1994) have shown how a visual target 
that is stored in working memory can be reached with a novel tool that ha;, never been used 
before. The latter study shows how a such a model can learn its own parameters through a 
type of Piagetian perfonn-ancHest developmental cycle. · 
'I'hus we arrive at an emerging picture of how the adaptive brain worko wherein the core 
is:;ue of how a brain can learn quickly ami stably about a changing world throughout life 
leads towards a mechanistic understanding of attention, intention, thinking, fantasy, and 
consciousness. 'J'he mediating events are adaptive resonances that effect a dynamic balance 
between the cornplcrnentary demands of stability and plasticity, and of expectation and 
novelty, and which arc a nece;,sary condition for consciousne:;;,. 
What vs. Where: Why Are Not Procedural Memories Conscious? 
Although the type of AH'I' matching, learning, and resonance that have been reviewed 
above seern to occur in rnany sensory and cognitive processes, they arc not the only types of 
matching and learning to occur in the brain. In fact, there :;eenrs to be a rnajor cliJierence 
between the types of learning that occ:ur in sensory and cognitive proce;,:;es versus those 
that occur in spatial and motor processes. In particular, sensory and cognitive processes are 
carried out in the What processing stream that passes through the inferotemporal cortex, 
whereas spatial and rnotor processes arc carried out in the Where processing stream that 
passes through the parietal cortex. What processing includes object recognition and event 
prediction. Where processing includes spatial navigation and motor control. I ;,uggest that 
the types of rnatching and learning that go on in the What and Where streams are different, 
indeed cornplerncntary, and that this difFerence is appropriate to their different roles. First 
consider how we usc a sensory expectation. Suppose, for example, that I ask you to "Look 
for the yellow ball, and if you lind it within :300 rn:;ec., I will give you $1,000,000." H you 
believed nrc, you could activate a sensory expectation of "yellow balls" that would rnake you 
much more sensitive to yellow and round objects in your environment. As in i\HT matching, 
once yon detected a yellow ball, you could then react to it much more quickly and with a 
much more energetic response than if you were not looking for it. ln other words, sensory 
and cognitive expectations lead to a type of excitatory matching. 
Now consider how we use a motor expectation. Such an expectation represents where we 
want to move (Bullock and Grossberg, 1988). For exa.rnple, it could represent a desired po-
sition for the hand to pick up an object. Such a motor expectation is matched against where 
the hand is now. After the hand actually rnoves to the desired position, no further rnovement 
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is required to satisfy the motor expectation. In this sense, rnotor expectations lead to a type 
of inhibitory matching. In surnma.ry, although the sensory and cognitive matching process 
is excitatory, the spatia.! and rnotor matching process is inhibitory. These are complemen-
tary properties. Models such as ARI' quantify how excitatory matching is accomplished. 
A difFerent type of model, called a Vector Associative lvlap, or YAM, model, suggests how 
inhibitory matching is accomplished (Gaucliano a.ncl Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, Guenther, 
Bullock, and Greve, 1993; Guenther, Bullock, Greve, and Grossberg, 1991). 
As shown in the discussions of AKJ' above, learning within the sensory and cognitive 
domain is often a type of match learning. It takes place only if there is a good enough match 
of top-clown expectations with bottom-up data to risk a.ltering previously stored knowledge 
within the system, or it can trigger learning of a new representation if a good enough match 
is not available. In contrast, learning within spatia.! and motor processes, such as YAM 
processes, is misma.tch learning that is used to either learn new sensory-motor maps (e.g., 
Grossberg, Guenther, Bullock, a.nd Greve, 1993) or to adjust the gains of sensory-motor 
commands (e.g., Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1996). 'fhese types of learning are also 
corn plementary. 
Why arc the types of learning that go into spatial and motor processes complernentary 
to those that are used for sensory and cognitive processing? My answer is that AH:I'-
like learning allows the brain to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma.. It enables us to 
continue learning more about the world in a stable fashion throughout life without forcing 
catastrophic forgetting of our previous memories. On t.he other hand, catastrophic forgetting 
is a good property when it takes place dming spatial and motor learning. We have no need 
to remember all the spatial and motor maps that we used when we were infants or children. 
In fact, those maps would cause us a lot of trouble if they were used to control our adult 
limbs. We want om spatial and motor processes t.o continuou:;ly adapt to changes in our 
motor apparatus. 'J'hese complementary types of learning allow our sensory and cognitive 
systerns to stably learn about tho world and to thereby be able to effectively control spatial 
and motor processes that continually update themselves to deal with changing conditions in 
our limbs. 
Vvhy, \.hen, arc procedural memories unconscious? 'I'he difFerence between cognitive 
rnernories and procedural, or rnotor, rncnroric;; has gone by a nurnber of difFerent name;;, 
including the distinction between declarative memory a.nd procedural rncrnory, knowing that. 
and knowing !row, rnemory and habit, or rnemory with record and memory without record 
(Bruner, HJ69; Miskin, 1982, 1993; H.ylc, JM9; Squire and Cohen, 1984). 'J'he amnesic 
patient IJM dramatically illustrated this di;;tinct.ion by learning and remembering motor 
skills like assernbly of the 'Ibwer of Ila.noi without being able to recall ever having done 
so (Bruner, HJ69; Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire and Cohen, 1981). We can now give 
a very short. answer to the question of why procedural memories arc uncom:cious: 'fhe 
matching that takes place during spatial ancl motor proces:;ing is often inhibitory matching. 
Such a matching process cannot support an excitatory resonance. Hence, it cannot support 
consciousness. 
In this regard, Goodale and Milner (HJ92) have described a patient whose brain lesion 
bas prevented accurate visual discrirnination of object. orientation, yet who;;e vi;;ually guided 
reaching behaviors towards objects a.re oriented a.nd ;;ized correctly. We have shown, in a 
series of articles, how head-centered a.nd body-centered representations of an object's spatia.] 
location and orientation may be learned a.nd used to control reaches of the hand-arm syst.crn 
that can continuously adapt themselves to change;; in t.he sensory and motor apparatus 
that i;; nsed to plan and execute reaching behaviors (Bullock, Grossberg, and Guenther, 
1993; Carpenter, Grossberg, and Lesher, 1998; Gaudiano and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 
Guenther, Bullock, and Greve, 199:J; Guenther, Bnllock, Greve, and Grossberg, 1994). None 
of these model circ:nit.s has resonant loops; hence, they do not support consciousness. 
When these models are combined into a, nrore comprehensive syst.ern architecture for 
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intelligent behavior, the sensory and cognitive match-based networks in the What processing 
stream through the inferotempora.l cortex provide self-stabili2ing representations with which 
to continually learn more about (.he world without undergoing catastrophic forgetting, while 
the Where/How processing stream's spatial and motor mismatch-based maps and gains can 
continually forget their old parameters in order to instate the new para.rneters that are needed 
to control our bodies in their present form. This larger architecture illustrates how circuits 
in the self-stabili2ing match-based sensory and cognitive parts of the brain can resonate into 
consciousness, even while they are helping to direct the contextually appropriate activation 
of spatial and motor circuits that cannot. 
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